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With the myriad of post–colonial conflicts that have and continue to 
afflict the African continent, it is seldom known that the longest running of these 
is that between Morocco and the Polisario Front on Western Sahara. The 
objective of this article to examine the roots of the conflict and provide some 
information about the occupation of Western-Sahara in 1975. 
 
The crisis over Western Sahara started in the early 1970s when Spain was 
forced to announce plans to withdraw from the territory it had effectively 
occupied since 1934.  
 
Both Morocco and Mauritania lodged claims to those parts of the territory 
they had occupied, considering them to have been part of their countries well 
before the Spanish occupation. To these two countries therefore, their move was 
one of ‘recovery’ rather than ‘occupation’.1 
 
The main causes of the conflict in Western Sahara may be encapsulated 
broadly in three interrelated categories: politics, economy and geopolitics. 
 
The political aspect relates to the Moroccan ideology of “Greater 
Morocco” which in the early 1960s, in defiance of the principle of uti possidetis 
juris (inviolability or sanctity of the borders inherited from the colonial era), 
espoused the idea of a greater pre-colonial Morocco extending over the territory 
of the Spanish Sahara, parts of present-day Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and 
Senegal.
2
 Mauritania’s involvement in the conflict was precisely due to the fear 
of its government that, after occupying Western Sahara, Morocco would 
continue its march southwards and eventually annex Mauritania as well.
3
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The second theme (the economic one) relates to the abundant natural 
resources of the Western Sahara. In particular, the discovery of significant 
phosphate deposits in the Bucraa region in the early 1940s triggered heightened 
interest in the territory from both Spain and then Morocco. Equally important 
are the rich fishing grounds off the Western Saharan coast, which were exploited 
illegally first by Spain (until its accession to the European Community (EC) in 
1986) and then by the European Union.  
 
It is also thought that the Territory has great potential in terms of 
commercial oil and gas reserves. Moroccan dealings in these resources led the 
United Nations Security Council in 2002 to request a legal opinion on the issue. 
In its opinion, UN legal counsel affirmed that any further exploration or 
exploitation of these resources would be illegal if it proceeded in disregard of 
the interests and wishes of the Sahrawi people and without consultation with 
their legitimate representative, the Polisario Front.
4
 
 
Finally, mention should be made of the international context at the time, 
particularly the Cold War, when the US and France joined hands to prevent the 
emergence of an independent state in Western Sahara. To this end, they exerted 
pressure on Spain, at a time when the Generalissimo Franco was on his 
deathbed, to hand over the Territory to Morocco.
5
 It is pertinent to recall, in this 
context, the position adopted by former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, 
who, in a recently declassified document of the State Department of 11 
November 1975, revealed that he was afraid that “Hassan [King of Morocco] 
may be overthrown if he does not get a success” in Western Sahara.6 In effect, 
the stability of the friendly Alaouite monarchy in Morocco – which is 
structurally weak in the absence of real political legitimacy – constituted the 
Western powers’ main reason for defending and supporting the indefensible fait 
accompli – Morocco’s illegal annexation of Western Sahara. 
 
At the request of the UN General Assembly, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) issued a legal opinion on Western Sahara on 16 October 1975 in 
which it clearly established that: 
 
The materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of 
territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom 
of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity.
7
 Thus the Court has not found legal ties of 
such a nature as might affect the application of General Assembly resolution 
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1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the 
principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the 
will of the peoples of the Territory. Shortly after the release of this opinion, 
King Hassan II of Morocco ordered the so-called “Green March” to invade the 
territory of Spanish Sahara. This march was finally set in motion on 6 November 
1975 after Moroccan armed forces had already advanced and penetrated the 
northern part of the Territory on 31 October. In response, the UN Security 
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 380 (1975) of 6 November 1975, in 
which it “deplored” the holding of the march and called upon Morocco “to 
withdraw from the Territory of Western Sahara and all the participants in the 
march”. 
 
On 14 November 1975, a secret deal (also known as the Madrid Tripartite 
Agreement) was signed in Madrid between the governments of Spain, Morocco 
and Mauritania, whereby Spain agreed to institute a temporary tripartite 
administration in the Territory, including representatives of Morocco, 
Mauritania and Spain. The agreement was evidently null and void, in terms of 
Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as it violated 
the United Nations Charter and various resolutions of the UN Security Council 
and General Assembly. To persist in their defiance of international law, 
Morocco and Mauritania signed an agreement on 14 April 1976 in which they 
partitioned and annexed Western Sahara – the northern part going to Morocco 
and the southern part to Mauritania. 
 
During the period of “Madrid negotiations” the units of the Spanish 
Foreign Legion, the Spanish Naval Infantry, Airborne, and Police units in the 
city of El Aaiun surrounded the districts where locals lived and started collecting 
weapons and arrested those who demanded independence. Local soldiers serving 
the Spanish (Troopas Nomadas, Policia Territorial and members of the Spanish 
Legion) were disarmed and disbanded. The Governor of the territory took 
discriminatory measures against the local people, e.g. he prohibited petrol 
stations from selling petrol to the local people. The Spanish military leadership 
set down immediately to work out the Golondrina evacuation plan of the civil 
population then they reinforced the defence of phosphate mines, important 
buildings and they started evacuating the garrisons in the desert.
8
 
 
By 8
th
 November more than 12,000 civilians had been evacuated from the 
territory by sea and air to the Canary Islands. Spanish merchants sold their shops 
with stocks and state-run schools were closed down because of the lack of 
teachers. The Spanish even transported their animals from the zoo to Almeria, 
exhumed their relatives buried in local cemeteries and transported the remains to 
the Canary Islands, where they reburied them. So by the time the parties 
                                                 
8
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announced the Madrid Accords, there had been no Spanish citizens in the 
Territory of once Spanish Sahara except for the armed forces and civil servants.  
 
On 12
th
 November leader of Polisario Front El-Vali announced that the 
Madrid Accords are considered null (15
th
 November), while independently of 
this King Hassan II announced on 15
th
 November that he had closed the Western 
Sahara file and appointed Ahmed Bensouda Governor of the territory in El-
Aaiun. As for Polisario the King stated that their leaders were unable to pull 
together the almost 60,000 Saharawians and they could stage actions only with 
the help of mercenaries who were unable to fight a desert war against the well-
trained Moroccans. This is why the organisation itself did not pose any threat to 
the state of Morocco. He made this statement being aware of the fact that the 
approximately 2,500 local troops and policemen previously hired by the Spanish 
joined Polisario with their weapons.
9
  
 
In the UN camp in Megaries Mehdi, one of the cooks who had been 
member of the Territorial Police in El-Aaiun joined the rebels together with the 
others after the retreat of the Spanish. According to him the Spanish let them 
down and he would have still served them if they had not retreated.  
 
Many more of the soldiers like him serving now in Polisario units but who 
used to serve with the Spanish Legion, with the Saharan nomad troops or the 
local police before, applied for a rent of merit to the Spanish Government. In 
accordance with the current negotiations the Spanish government would pay 
service rent to all those who had served at least 10 years in any of the armed 
units established and led by Spain.  
 
Subsequently, the Moroccan military started their entry into Western 
Sahara and Spain announced that in a couple of months they would end civil 
administration on the territory. (only Franco could have protested because of the 
Moroccan occupation but he died on 20
th
 November) The situation was further 
complicated by the fact that on 28
th
 November in Guelta the Jemma dissolved 
itself in spite of the fact that according to the three-party agreement the council 
was intended to play a significant role in settling the situation.
10
  
 
A delegation of people living in former Spanish Sahara held a press 
conference organised by Polisario in Algiers on 6
th
 December. The Deputy 
President of Jemma together with 56 other representatives were also part of the 
delegation (three of them were also members of the Spanish Parliament, the 
Cortes). The Secretary General of Jemma declared their joint proclamation on 
the dissolution of the Council and the establishment of the 41-strong Saharawian 
                                                 
 
9
 Tony Hodges; The Roots of a Desert War (Lawrance Hill & Company, 1983.) p. 230.  
10
 UN Document S/11902, December 10, 1975.  
 80 
Interim National Council. The statement was signed by the 67 members of 
Jemma as well as by several tribal leaders.
11
  
 
Since the Madrid Accords recognized Jemma as the official representative 
of the Saharawians, by dissolving the Council the Saharawians deprived 
Morocco of the possibility to use the organization for its own purposes and the 
other signatories of the Accords were also put into an embarrassing situation.  
 
''The views of the Saharan population, expressed through Jemma, will be 
respected.'' Article 3 (18) 
 
It was under these circumstances that on 10
th
 December the UN passed 
two resolutions that partly contradicted each other.
12
  
 
The first Resolution (3458/A) reiterated the right to self-determination of 
the people of Western Sahara already present in previous resolutions, which 
stated that Spain and the UN are responsible for decolonizing the territory.
13
 The 
resolution was passed with 86 votes for, 41 abstentions and no votes against. 
 
The second Resolution (3458/B) acknowledged the three party Madrid 
Accords and called on the signatories to ensure respect for the freely expressed 
aspirations of the Saharan population. At the same time it requested the 
Secretary General to appoint a representative who would supervise the free 
referendum.
14
 The situation in this case was not as clear as in the previous one 
because 56 countries voted for the resolution, 42 against it and 34 abstained. By 
the time the resolutions were passed, a significant part of Western Sahara was 
occupied by the Moroccans.  
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Source: C. R. Pennel: Morocco since 1830 a history, p. 341 
On the map you can see the territory divided between the Moroccan and 
Mauritanian governments in the Madrid Accords.  
 
A part of the Sahara territories was occupied by the end of November 
1975 by the Moroccan army.
15
 The invasion forces in cooperation with the 
withdrawing Spanish army started the occupation of the area from two separate 
directions. 
 
The objective of the units advancing along the coast line was to capture 
El-Aaiun and the phosphate mines at Bou Craa. According to the first official 
reports the Moroccan forces penetrated Western Sahara 100 kilometres deep and 
on 28
th
 November the second largest settlement, Smara was also taken.
16
 
 
In less than a month a 25,000-strong contingent, that is one third of the 
Moroccan Army, was stationed in the occupied Sahara territories. 15,000 troops 
deployed in the Saguia El-Hamra garrisons (Farsia, Jdiriya, Haousa, Smara), 
5,000 men in El-Aaiun, and another 5,000 soldiers were stationed near the 
southern borders of former Spanish Sahara. The offensive went simultaneously 
with a mass migration of the population.
17
 
 
On 11
th
 December Moroccan units captured El-Aaiun (there was Polisario 
resistance only in a few places although on 12
th
 December a minor unit attacked 
the Moroccan troops in the town), while Mauritanian forces, launching their 
offensive occupied La Guerra, then Tichla. 
 
By the end of December the Spanish forces had gradually withdrawn from 
the town, on 28
th
 December the airfield was handed over, then on 12
th
 January 
1976 the last of their soldiers left former Spanish Sahara when Villa Cisneros 
was abandoned. 
 
Afterwards there were only 150 Spanish civil servants in El-Aaiun in 
order to implement and supervise the smooth handover of the public 
administration of the area. The last Spanish citizen who left the town in late 
February 1976 was Colonel Rafael de Veldes Iglesias and thus the Kingdom of 
Spain ceased to be a factor in Western Sahara.
18
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Local soldiers made redundant from Spanish military service joined their 
previous enemy, Polisario, and established Sahara Liberation Army for fighting 
Moroccan troops (SLA).
19
 In spite of the fact that ill-armed Western Saharans 
tried mostly to defend (and evacuate civil population), one of their minor units 
attacked the Mauritanian town of Zuerat as early as 29 December. The town, 
also a mining centre, is located in 400 kilometres from the capital deep in the 
desert. During the attack the infrastructure of the mine was damaged but the 
town itself was not occupied although it was defended only by 60 Mauritanian 
troops. At that time the Mauritanian army had merely some 3,000 trained 
soldiers, 2,000 gendarmes, and a few obsolete fighter planes, which made its 
units an easy target for Saharawian guerrillas, constantly harassing them. Former 
foreign legion fortress famous Ait Ben Tili, surrounded by Saharawian units, 
was also defended by Mauritanian forces. In order to help out defenders in dire 
straits President Ould Daddah requested combat planes from the Moroccan Air 
Force. 
 
However, not even the Air Force was able to bring relief to the fortress; 
moreover one of the Moroccan Northrop F-5s was downed by the guerrillas. 
Finally, the fortress was captured by Polisario troops on 21
st
 January.
20
 
 
In the following days insurgents attacked the towns of Bir Moghrein and 
Inal but despite the huge damage inflicted they were unable to capture them 
because of the concerted counterattacks of the Mauritanian army. 
 
With French assistance the Mauritanian forces were reorganised and in 
the third week of December launched a counteroffensive near the border with 
Western Sahara. After a short but bloody battle they took the town of La Guerra 
and started to push back Polisario fighters and their civil supporters from the 
area (19
th
 December).
21
 On the next day Tichla fell but Argoub, a small town 
near Villa Cisneros was captured only on 11
th
 January after a two-week-long 
siege. The roughly 200 soldiers and civilians defending the town fought until the 
very last bullet and the Mauritanians managed to take only a few prisoners – 
seriously wounded soldiers – as the majority of defenders had gotten killed 
during the battle. Since that time Saharawians had had only one option – to 
flee.
22
 
 
The refugees went first to the northern area of Western Sahara bordering 
Mauritania (Amgala, Guelta-Zemmour, Oum Dreiga, Tifariti, etc.), then they 
were evacuated to Algeria with the assistance of the Algerian Army.
23
 Besides 
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providing transportation to the refugees Algeria also supplied weapons, food, 
drinking water, and medicine to Saharawian soldiers.
24
 
 
As early as that time the first cracks in the Moroccan-Mauritanian 
Alliance appeared because the Moroccans were worried that the Mauritanian 
troops could not take Villa Cisneros on time and entered the town under the 
command of Colonel Dlimi. A Moroccan garrison was established there in spite 
of the fact that in accordance with the Madrid Agreement the town would be 
controlled by the Mauritanians. Although a Mauritanian administrative centre 
was set up in the town the real power was represented by Morocco.
25
 
 
On 27
th
 January 1976 Moroccan military units attacked an Algerian 
convoy at Amgala (first Amgala battle) and the Algerian troops withdrew after a 
several days battle, as they had suffered heavy casualties.
26
 
 
Thanks to its significant water supply Amgala is a very important place in 
the Saguia el-Hamra valley, where a Polisario logistic base was established with 
Algerian support. Refugees were provided with food and medicaments from this 
place and they were also further transported to safe havens in Algerian 
territories. The unexpected Moroccan attack inflicted heavy damage to the 
Algerians and 99 of their soldiers were captured.
27
 The furious Algerian High 
Command demanded an immediate retaliation and the breakout of a war 
between the two countries were prevented by the bold and decisive action of 
Algerian President Boumedien. From that time the Algerian leadership increased 
its material support to the rebels but held back its troops from further clashes.
28
 
 
The retaliation came fairly soon – between 13th and 15th February 
Polisario units defeated Moroccan troops in the second Amgala battle. 
 
As for the balance of power Moroccan and Mauritanian troops had 
superiority although the combat worthiness of the Mauritanian units equipped 
with French weapons and trained by French specialists was rather low.
29
 The 
rebel forces consisted of a few thousand volunteers equipped with small arms, 
mortars, and some antitank missiles and SAMs from the Algerian and Libyan 
armies.
30
 As the performance of the Moroccan troops in the desert was far from 
what King Hassan II had expected from them the Moroccan Air Force raided the 
refugee camps in order to put an end to war as soon as possible. From 22
nd
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February several air raids were launched against refugee camps Guelta-
Zemmour, Tifariti, and Oum Dreiga. The bombings were approved by Colonel 
Dlimi and it was also him who approved the use of napalm bombs which are 
more efficient than conventional ones.
31
 However, those bombing raids were 
nearly inefficient from military aspect as their victims were mostly children, 
women, and elderly people.
32
 
 
The Royal Moroccan troops also applied methods that had already been 
used by the Spanish before: poisoning wells, machine-gunning herds, looting 
civilian population, tortures, and even public executions.
33
 As a result of such 
events and atrocities the mass migration of civil population accelerated. By the 
end of February the number of people, mostly children, women, and elderly 
people living in refugee camps in Algeria had increased to more than 100,000.
34
 
 
The Spanish troops were supposed to withdraw by 28
th
 February 1976 but 
had left the area earlier, thus abandoning its population. 
 
Although the UNHCR realised the desperate situation of refugees in 
camps he could not respond immediately therefore he called on those 
sympathising with the Saharawians to help. 
 
The Algerian Government was not prepared to receive and supply so 
many refugees either, which led to critical medical and hygienic situation in the 
camps soon. 
 
On the actual situation in the camps a report was written by the members 
of a Swiss group of medical doctors, who had arrived into the region with the 
help on the International Red Cross in order to help the refugees.
35
 This is how 
the members of the group – Dr. Elio Canevaschini, Dr. Emmanuel Martinoli, Dr. 
Marie-Claire Martinoli and Dr. Marc Oltramare – tell about their experience: 
„We have the sensation that both the Algerian Government and the Red 
Cross are able to provide only limited assistance to the refugees therefore 
we regard the rapid international cooperation and immediate help to 
refugees of extreme importance. 
The number of refugees is growing by the day due to newcomers and 
the majority of the mass of people is comprised by women, children, and 
elderly people. 
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The proportion of children under 15 is 45% and that of babies under 1 
year is around 6-7%. The refugees are accommodated in 14 camps and 
their number is over 70,000. Their accommodation poses a serious 
problem as 3-4 families share a tent. Due to infections and other diseases 
there is a grave risk of epidemics. 
Firewood is another serious problem as these people often have to go 
200 kilometres for collecting firewood. Then it is equally divided among 
the refugees but still there are some who lack firewood. 
Food supply also presents difficult problems as the monthly supply of a 
refugee is 6 kg of flour or wheat, 3 kg dried vegetables, 2 kg sugar, 2 kg 
powdered milk, 3 kg dates and 1 kg of tea. 
The refugees are living under very bad conditions – many of them are 
traumatised or suffering from burns from the bombings. They are treated 
by 3 doctors, 15 assistant doctors, and a few enthusiastic volunteers.” 
 
On the basis of the mandate provided by the General Assembly in 
December 1975 UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim sent a special 
representative to Madrid, Rabat, Algiers and Western Sahara in order to initiate 
negotiations on the soonest possible implementation of UN Resolutions.
36
 His 
Special Envoy was Swedish UN diplomat Olaf Rydbeck, who started his work 
on 7
th
 February when he visited El-Aaiun, Smara and Dakhla. He was deeply 
shocked by the news on the events that took place in the territories occupied by 
the Moroccan and Mauritanian forces (bombing of refugees, escalation of 
guerrilla war, etc.) and in his report clearly stated that on the basis of what he 
had seen it was impossible to organise a free referendum in Western Sahara. 
Thus the tour of duty of the UNSG Special Envoy was unsuccessful and 
“Morocco could continue the reunification of the territories of Western Sahara 
to the motherland.” 
 
On 25
th
 February the Jemma was summoned (out of its 102 members 57 
came to the conference but not all of them supported the Moroccan and 
Mauritanian territorial demands)
37
 thus the vacant seats of those supporting the 
rebels were handed over to representatives loyal to Morocco. The new Council 
sworn in to King Hassan II but neither the UN, nor Polisario, nor even Spain 
accepted the new Jemma as the legal representative body of the Saharawians 
since the genuine Jemma was dismissed in November 1975. That time Spain 
submitted a report to the UNSG and declared a withdrawal from the territory.
38
 
 
Responding to the Moroccan measures President of the Sahara Interim 
National Council Uld Ziou on the main square of a refugee camp in Ait Ben Tili, 
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near Bir Lahlou, declared the establishment of Sahara Arab Democratic 
Republic at midnight 28
th
 February.
39
 
On 5
th
 March 1976 Ahmed Baba Miske introduced the first Government 
of Western Sahara in Hotel Saint-Georges in Algiers. Madagascar was the first 
country to recognise the new state and later on another 78 countries followed 
suit.
40
 In spite of the fact that later, due to diplomatic pressure, many of them 
suspended the relations with the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic, it keeps 
maintaining some official relations with 54 countries. However, the declaration 
of independence did not trigger many changes as the Moroccan Army continued 
to occupy the territory. 
 
On 14
th
 April 1976 the allied powers, occupying most of the territories, 
officially signed the treaty on the division of the area and on drawing a new 
border line between the two countries.
41
 Morocco received the two biggest 
towns, El-Aaiun and Smara, and the phosphate mines thus increasing its areas 
by some 35%,
42
 while Mauritania was given Villa Cisneros and a long section of 
the coast line with good fisheries, however, the inland area comprised only 
desert and nothing else.
43
 That is, the treaty on the division of the area clearly 
favoured Morocco. 
 
Escalation of the Conflict 
 
Once the new state was declared the UN Secretary General decided to 
delegate the Swedish UN diplomat Olaf Rydbeck to help bring about a possible 
agreement. In his statement of 25
th
 March 1976 the Secretary General detailed 
the purpose of the delegation: to obtain the opinions of the Moroccan and 
Mauritanian Governments about Resolution 3458 of the General Assembly. The 
planned visit elicited strong objection in Moroccan public opinion, and the 
Swedish diplomat's visit to the refugee camps in the vicinity of Tinduf on 31
st
 
March led to serious tension between Morocco and the UN.
44
 
 
On 4
th
 April 1976 Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Laraki 
informed the UN Secretary General that the special representative will not be 
authorised to continue his mission in Rabat.
45
 Shortly afterwards the 
Government of Mauritania also announced, that the diplomat's visit would not 
be timely. After this the Secretary General himself initiated negotiations with the 
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UN ambassadors of the involved countries, but could not achieve any significant 
results. 
 
Polisario reopened hostilities. The series of attacks known as the May 20 
Offensive commenced in earnest on 11
th
 May, when coordinated assaults were 
launched against El-Aaiun, Smara, Bou Kra, Bir Moghrein and Chinguetti, and 
damaged the phosphate-carrying conveyor-belt system.
46
 
 
Before launching the offensive the Saharawians warned the foreign 
citizens working in the phosphate mines and the Mauritanian iron-ore mines that 
if they do not leave the area they would be treated as enemies. At that time over 
280 highly trained French experts, employees of COMINOR (Comptoir Minier 
du Nord) worked in the Mauritanian iron-ore mines. The Mauritanians were 
supposed to guarantee their safety. The warning was labelled as a terrorist threat, 
and those affected did not take it seriously, so the attack against Mauritania's 
capital, Nouakchott, by Polisario units on 8 June 1976 was a serious surprise.
47
 
 
The fact that a military unit of about 600 men was able to march 
unnoticed more than 1,000 km through enemy territory indicated a thorough 
knowledge of the terrain, and support of the local population. The attack lasted 
nearly one hour, the selected targets (including the presidential palace) were 
subjected to mortar and machine gun fire. Some of the local units fled, but the 
Saharawians were not able to exploit their success because their leader, El-Vali 
Mustafa Sayed was also killed during the attack.
48
 
 
At the same time Polisario also attacked Tan-Tan, Jdiria and Guelta-
Zemmour in the northern areas. At that time the Saharawians had already 
changed their tactics: they had realised, that in the face of mechanised and well-
equipped Moroccan units they could not successfully defend the population 
centres still in their possession, and reverted to guerrilla warfare with which they 
were already familiar, and which had brought them greater success. 
 
Since tribes related to the Saharawians lived throughout Mauritania and 
southern Morocco, they could count on support from a part of the population 
during nearly all of their attacks. Polisario units, consisting of several hundred 
men could move with relative ease not only through the occupied territories, but 
on the territory of enemy states as well. 
 
The Moroccans firmly held the towns and forts handed over by the Spain, 
but their supply lines were under constant attack. 
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Mauritania, beset by economic and ethnic tensions, was the weaker of the 
two countries, therefore Polisario was more active in the territories occupied by 
it than in those occupied by Morocco.
49
 
 
War with Mauritania 
 
On 15
th
 January 1976 President Oud Daddah appointed a trusted veteran 
politician, Hamoud Ould Abdel-Wedoud as Governor of the territories occupied 
by Mauritania.
50
 The new governor initiated an administrative reorganization of 
the territory and turned it into a separate region called Tiris el-Gharbia, with 
Dakhla as its capital.
51
 The new region was subdivided into four districts 
(Dakhla, Awsard, Tichla és Argoub). 
 
They created three military districts in order to establish firmer control of 
the occupied territories. The headquarters of the first district was established in 
the town of Awsard; its commander was Colonel Viah Ould Mayouf, who had 
prepared the territory's occupation and directed the war against the Polisario. 
The headquarters of the second district was deployed in Zouerat; its commander 
was Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Ould Bouceif, who was responsible for 
Mauritania's north-eastern territories. Bir Moghrein and Ain Ben Tili were under 
him also. The headquarters of the third district was established in Dakhla, 
Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi was assigned to command it.
52
 
 
About this time the task of settling the refugees in camps was completed, 
and the Saharawian could begin the systematic destruction of the two occupying 
countries' economic institutions. 
 
In the spirit of the Sahara Arab traditions - and due to low standards of 
training and a shortage of heavy weapons - Polisario organised guerrilla 
operations (ghazzi). Their units (kataeb), equipped with Land Rovers and light 
personal weapons, would cover several hundred kilometres, deliver a quick raid, 
then disappear.
53
 Since the Mauritanian desert is nearly twice the size of France, 
the military and law enforcement forces available to the local authorities were 
insufficient to keep the territory under control.  
 
Insurgent attacks made transportation of phosphate mined in the Bou Craa 
mines impossible (between 1976 and 1979 the Fosbucraa company lost 1.722 
billion Pesetas due to the attacks). The rail line connecting the Mauritanian iron-
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ore mines to the seaport was regularly damaged which caused serious problems 
to Mauritania, whose main source of earnings was iron-ore.
54
 The Mauritanian 
political leadership was shaken by the attacks, but they thought that the situation 
could be salvaged by some quick changes in the armed forces leadership. 
 
Thus, the Chief of Staff was immediately dismissed. Lieutenant Colonel 
Ahmed Ould Bouceif, commander of the second military district replaced him.  
 
This was the first time the Mauritanian leadership criticised the activities 
of the Moroccan army, since they had been expecting the Moroccans to start a 
counteroffensive against Polisario. However, the Moroccans settled into 
defensive positions and did not pursue the Saharawians retreating into the 
Sahara. As a result, Polisario fighters launched attacks against the Mauritanian 
towns of Nema and Tisitt from territories occupied by Morocco. 
 
Due to the escalating attacks the Mauritanian army's strength was 
increased to 17,000 men (of these 10,000 officers, non-commissioned officers 
and soldiers belonged to the black minority; this would eventually generate 
serious tensions within the army and lead to several mutinies), and purchased 
modern weapons.
55
 Training of the new recruits was accelerated in the training 
centre established with French assistance in the town of Atar. However, none of 
these measures brought any significant success.
56
 
 
In this auspicious military situation the III. Polisario Congress was held 
on 24
th
 August 1976. In addition to the press, several official government 
delegations (Benin, Algeria, Bissau-Guinea, Libia, and some others) also 
attended. Members of the former Jemma and the Deputy Secretary General of 
PUNS (Sahara National Unity Party) also attended. During the Congress the first 
Constitution of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was approved, 
which meant final ratification of the draft the Sahara Provisional National 
Council had published in February. 
 
That was the time when new Polisario leader Mohamed Abdelaziz was 
elected Head of the Council of Ministers. Although the delegates agreed to 
continue the armed struggle they also decided to commence a diplomatic 
offensive in order to inform the world on the real situation. As a result, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic Hakim Brahim even 
participated in the Geneva congress of the Socialist International as an observer. 
Since every diplomatic contact was extremely important for the new state it tried 
to establish contacts with every country, regardless of its political leanings, in 
order to gain the broadest possible recognition. 
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SADR representatives participated as an official delegation in the XIII. 
Summit of the Organisation of African Unity in Port Louis (Mauritius), where 
29 African countries voted for the Western Saharawian's right to self 
determination, independence, and territorial integrity. As a consequence of the 
voting, Morocco announced suspension of its activities in the organisation. The 
diplomatic offensive, launched with the assistance of Algeria, brought some 
success, since by the first half of 1977 the Western-Sahara sate was recognised 
by nine African countries (Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Bissau-Guinea, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Ruanda and Togo).
57
 
 
Naturally, as a result of this they also tried to increase the effectiveness of 
military operations thus on 1
st
 May 1977 the insurgents launched another attack 
against Zuerat in Mauritania. The town was defended by a garrison of nearly 
1,000 men as well as a 60 km barrier of 3 to 5 m deep ditches reinforced with 
barbed wire. 
 
There were nearly 250 French miners (among them military advisers), 
employees of SNIM (Societé Nationale Industrielle et Miniére) and their 
families in the town. Although the expert responsible for their safety, Jean-
Charles Eudeline had repeatedly recommended evacuation of the families his 
recommendations had been overruled. The guerrillas opened their attack at 
05:00 hours with a coordinated mortar barrage. The attack lasted about four 
hours, during which the power station, the fuel tanks and the mining equipment 
were so heavily damaged, that production had to be suspended for a while. 
During the battle two French experts were killed, and six others were taken 
prisoner by the attackers. After this most French personnel and their dependents 
(altogether 449 persons) were evacuated to France.
58
 
 
The suspension of production caused serious damage to the Mauritanian 
economy. At that time Mauritania was able to handle its problems stemming 
from the situation in Western Sahara only through military assistance from 
Morocco (as a result of the 13
th
 May 1977 military agreement some 10,000 well-
trained and equipped Moroccan soldiers were stationed in Mauritanian territory), 
and financial assistance from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates.
59
 
 
In spite of the freshly arrived Moroccan troops, Polisario units launched 
another attack against Nouakchott then after the successful operation they 
withdrew without losses. 
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The attacks generated protests from France. French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Louis de Guiringaud accused Algeria of organising the attacks, and 
demanded the release of Frenchmen taken prisoner. The Algerian leadership 
rejected the French accusation in an official communiqué. 
 
France then sent a 200-men military unit to secure the capital, and from 
the end of November strengthened the defence of the larger Mauritanian 
population centres with Jaguar strike aircraft from Dakar airbase (Operation 
Lamantin).
60
 
 
The Mauritanian situation worried France because the country was a 
former French colony and belonged in their military and economic spheres of 
interest. Mauritania had emphasised separation from France after gaining 
independence (introduction of its own currency, Ouguiya, and nationalization of 
the iron-ore mines), yet a thousand ties linked it to the former colonial power. 
When even the capital came under Polisario attack, the frightened President 
turned to the French leadership and requested their urgent assistance. A new 
military assistance and cooperation agreement was soon signed, and France sent 
fifteen military instructors to the Atar military academy, to assist in training 
Mauritanian officers.  
 
However, these steps only encouraged the guerrillas, who took two more 
French mining experts prisoner.  
 
Then French president Giscard d’ Estaing immediately created a crisis 
team in the presidential palace in order to solve the situation as soon as possible.  
 
The crisis team included Minister of Defence Yvon Bourges, Minister for 
Cooperation between the Armed Services Robert Galley, Chief of Staff of the 
French army General Guy Méry, and the president's representative Louis de 
Guiringaud. Calling on experts of the army and the intelligence services, the 
crisis team begun to develop possible plans in the rooms of the headquarters 
beneath the Elysée palace (COA-Centre Operationnel des Armées). 
 
Due to the high risk factor and difficulties in locating the French hostages, 
the Chief of Staff rejected the possibility of a commando-style rescue operation. 
After a short debate his opinion was accepted by the other participants. General 
Méry then recommended negotiations to free the hostages, and at the same time 
deploying forces in Mauritania to defend French interests. The participants 
accepted the general's plan and immediately started to execute it.
61
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Some of the French supersonic combat aircraft stationed at Oukkam 
airbase in Senegal were placed on alert, since they could reach Nouakchott's 
airspace in less than 50 minutes. The unit of 1,300 French soldiers deployed at 
the airbase was reinforced by a further 300 troops. During the night of 1
st
 
November a force composed of rapid response units under the command of 
General Michael Forget landed at the base in Senegal, then a few days later the 
General and 60 of his specially trained soldiers redeployed to Atar, in 
Mauritanian territory. 
 
Command of the Ouakkam base was taken over by Colonel Huret, who 
was also responsible for the logistic support for Operation Lamantin. On his 
arrival Forget immediately begun to develop communications routes between 
Ouakkam and the Mauritanian bases. Meanwhile Breguet-Atlantic aircraft of the 
French Navy carried out reconnaissance patrols over Mauritania. Although these 
aircraft had originally been used for detecting submarines, they and their trained 
crews constituted an important element of the Operation. In addition, the French 
also used long-range Mirage 4 reconnaissance aircraft to map and photograph 
less well known regions. In accordance with the request of the Oaukkam airbase, 
the aircraft were launched from Bordeaux, France.  
 
The purpose of the reconnaissance flights was to locate the Polisario units 
and observe their movements, then inform the Mauritanian military and 
gendarme units preparing for a counterattack, as well as the French strike 
aircraft. In order to support the operation, the Moroccans sent a further 600 
troops to areas occupied by Mauritania, where soon there were 1,200 Moroccan 
soldiers, and further units were arriving from Morocco. In January 1978 there 
were 2,400 soldiers stationed in the area of Zouerat-Nouadhibou, 600 at the 
Akjouj iron-ore mines, and a further 2,800 men in Tiris el-Gharbia. The 
Moroccan Air Force deployed three F-5 fighter-bomber aircraft to Nouadhibou 
airfield, in order to participate in combined operations.
62
 
 
It seemed unlikely that Polisario would challenge such a powerful force, 
therefore the Mauritanian leadership restarted rail traffic on the Nouadhibou-
Zouerat line, which had already been shut down for a month. 
 
However, the Saharawians attacked the first freight train and took the 
French engineer prisoner, along with the train's Mauritanian military escort. 
 
The French were incensed, and on 25
th
 November they transferred a 
further four Jaguar combat aircraft from their base in Toul to Mauritania, in 
order to participate in the counterattack against Polisario. This type of combat 
aircraft was far more modern than the Northrop F-5 used by the Moroccans. The 
French army commissioned these long-range aircraft in 1971. Each was 
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equipped with two 30 mm cannons and an anti-aircraft missile jammer system. 
At that time the French had six Jaguars, two KC-135 F, two Breguet-Atlantic 
and four Noratlas aircraft at Ouakkam airbase. 
 
The Jaguars were first used on 2
nd
 December against guerrillas attacking 
the rail line near Boulanour, then on 12
th
 December in the vicinity of Zouerat.
63
 
As a result of the air strikes Polisario offered to release the French prisoners 
taken in Mauritania, but the French forces continued their attacks. Polisario 
commenced talks with then UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim then on 23
rd
 
December released the French prisoners without any conditions.
64
 
 
The French leadership would have liked to continue the operation, but due 
to the press-campaign of the SADR and the protests of several human rights 
organisations they finally instructed the General Staff to withdraw the French 
forces. After this, although they continued to aid the Mauritanian government, 
France took no active part in operations against Polisario.
65
 
 
The guerrillas, no longer threatened by French air strikes, immediately 
renewed their attacks against Mauritanian targets (rail lines, mines, etc). By that 
time Mauritania was facing serious economic and internal political problems, 
and these attacks hastened the country's withdrawal soon from the West-Sahara 
conflict.
66
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